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WORKING
HOLI DAY
High unem- 
ployment 
doesn’t 
cause the 
anger it 
once did. 
Jocelyn 
Pixley 
thinks that 
‘postindustrial' 
ism’ is at 
least partly 
to blame. 
She argues 
that before 
we invent a 
future ‘be­
yond work’ 
we need a 
future with 
work.
I
f the government loses power at the forth­
coming federal election, mass unemployment 
will be one of the primary factors in its demise. 
Labor’s 1983 commitment to ‘Jobs, Jobs, Jobs’ 
now looks very hollow. Many of the policy changes 
of the past decade such as workplace restructuring, 
enhanced freedom of capital movements and wage- 
squeezing under the Accords did, for a time, buy a 
high level of job-growth—albeit mainly service- 
oriented and often part-time. But nothing much 
has withstood the effects of long-term global reces­
sion on Australia. In 1993, unemployment levels 
of over 11% may well be politically unacceptable. 
But 20 years ago such rates were unthinkable. 
Since 1945 most people had believed that mass 
unemployment would never return. What hap­
pened to that belief?
The idea that ‘industrial society’ is dead cer­
tainly predates chronic unemployment, but it cap­
tured a much larger audience as the 1970s reces­
sion developed. The postindustrial analysis was 
not only a plausible description of economic 
trends—away from manufacturing employment 
and towards the service sector—but it also offered 
hope. A new belief emerged, far from the limited 
ambitions of job creation schemes, a belief in a 
potentially different era ‘beyond employment’. 
There was no need to be as alarmed by mass 
unemployment as in the 1930s, because the ‘cure’ 
no longer lay in jobs. Barry Jones wanted sleepers 
to wake up to the future of work; at a 1980 confer­
ence in Canberra, the conspicuously employed 
worried themselves over the topic 'When Ma­
chines Replace People. What W ill People Do?’; 
Andr£ Gorz described the Paths to Paradise as the 
Liberation from Work. Postindustrial terms like the 
‘information age’, cybernetic or service society and 
the critique of ‘productivism’ were drawn upon in 
the emerging Green politics.
By equating productivism with participation, 
chronic unemployment could be regarded as ben­
eficial, because the frugal simplicity enjoyed by the 
jobless indicated the path the whole world must 
take, away from consumerism and polluting facto­
ries. These ideas were widely disseminated by the 
early Green movement. Rather than leading to 
depression, unemployment would be the basis of 
utopia.
According to postindustrialists in the Left, the 
condition of being employed, so long feted as the 
norm, should be rejected in favour of revaluing 
other kinds of work and removing the stigma of 
dependency. The time (recession) was ripe for the 
separation of income from work, through the life­
time provision of an income guaranteed by the state 
and by seeking alternatives to wage labour (self- 
help). Thus mass unemployment could even be 
welcomed and ecologically destructive economic 
growth could possibly be halted as well.
These hopes have contributed to the wide­
spread indifference towards chronic unemployment. 
Those who would otherwise be more likely to be 
sympathetic to the unemployed have instead imag­
ined that a positive future of creative work and 
income security for all will emerge from this gloom. 
Meaningless jobs will be replaced by co-operative
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harmony, informal bartering of skills and produce, 
and networks of communes and self-help teams. 
Men will join women in a revaluing of traditional 
domestic work.
This apparently attractive vision is in my view 
gravely mistaken. Not only has it left the field to 
punitive neoliberal views, a problem in itself, but it 
has also held out the hope that there might be ‘soft 
options’ available to tackle chronic unemploy­
ment. These post industrial soft options, however, 
have been rapidly transformed into harsh ones 
which have left the unemployed even more 
marginalised than before. Apart from economic 
liberals who welcome the capacity of unemploy­
ment to control workers and drive down wages, 
there are many who worry about unemployment 
but cannot see any genuinely new sources of jobs. 
How many really believe that a GST here or a new 
railroad there will have any significant effect? 
Many believe that microchips and robots have 
irrevocably destroyed industrial jobs; hence the 
tinkering offered by political parties is completely 
unconvincing. This cultural malaise about em­
ployment silences any hint of a Keynesian revival. 
Mass unemployment today appears quite different
to that of previous periods. This time, there is little 
confidence that jobs will eventually return.
Instead, many find the postindustrial description 
of long-term trends much more persuasive. The first 
trend is the permanent decline and relocation of 
manufacturing jobs—the male ‘Fordist’ life-cycle is 
over. The second trend is the rise in service employ­
ment and a massive growth of female, part-time 
employment. Two interpretations of such trends 
suggest themselves—either we could move, like the 
USA, to a situation of ‘junk jobs’ with a permanent 
‘underclass’, or to more ‘woman-friendly’ service 
and environmental forms of employment.
The description is convincing enough, but the 
conclusion often drawn—that we should abandon 
any search for new jobs— is far more questionable. 
The stress on a ‘post-employment’ society by 
progressives like Keane, Block, Offe and Jordan 
rejects any potential path to new forms of employ­
ment. This position, however, ends up with re­
sponses like those of economic liberals. A kind of 
convergence has occurred between the post industrial 
search for ‘nonemployment’ and the neoliberal view 
of unemployment, which sees large numbers of job­
less primarily as a means of bringing down wages.
Life after work: 
kids at a Sydney 
soup kitchen
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*Corporate 
citizens of 
the world 
can pick 
and choose 
where the 
cheapest 
labour and 
land can be 
found*
convergence has occurred between the 
postindustrial search for ‘nonemployment’ and the 
neoliberal view of unemployment, which sees large 
numbers of jobless primarily as a means of bringing 
down wages.
The postindustrial position appears at first sight 
to offer the exact opposite to a cheap labour force 
disciplined by a large pool of jobless, because the 
postindustrial proposals are based on the expecta­
tion that ‘nonemployment’ will radically under­
mine or subvert the conventional employment sys­
tem. But this distinction depends on three major 
assumptions. The first is that a policy that aimed at 
separating income from work would be properly 
implemented by governments. That is, successive 
governments are expected to act benignly (and 
generously) in implementing a guaranteed income 
scheme and in supporting alternatives to conven­
tional jobs. The second assumption is that markets 
generally would decline in importance if large num­
bers of people were engaged in non-market activi­
ties. Third, the allegedly subversive nature of the 
postindustrial strategy draws on the counter-cul­
ture experiments of the 1960s which rejected wage 
labour. The distinction between the neoliberal 
view and the post industrial one depends on whether 
these three assumptions are well founded and, in my 
opinion, they are not.
Postindustrialists claim they are defending the 
unemployed by providing conditions that would 
challenge the prevailing system and overturn the 
present stigma and punishment meted out to the 
unemployed. For post-industrialists it is futile and 
undesirable to pursue job creation on the grounds 
that employment is a mere discipline that prevents 
wider democratic participation for various reasons. 
Employment for them is unrelated to citizenship, 
because universal civil, political and social rights 
should be safeguarded by governments and in the 
securing of these rights, formal participation in paid 
work is irrelevant, even counter-productive.
Yet some governments have actually aimed to 
implement postindustrial schemes, while in no way 
according with the postindustrial challenge to sub­
vert the economic order. In a situation of rising 
welfare payments for the unemployed, governments 
have been more concerned to reduce these budgets. 
Accordingly, several governments have transformed 
ideas for guaranteed incomes, communes, worker 
co-operatives and ‘informal work’ into means of 
further marginalising those excluded from the la­
bour market. They have used the schemes to legiti­
mate their own failures to ameliorate the level of 
unemployment. More seriously, they have used 
them to render marginal categories even more 
powerless by withdrawing the possibility for the 
excluded to make full claims for citizen rights.
A guaranteed income scheme was nearly intro­
duced in the US by President Nixon with the aim 
of reducing female welfare claimants and to force
male black populations into low paid sectors of the 
labour market. In New Zealand, in the late 1980s, 
a ‘compensation’ to offset the previous Labour gov­
ernment’s GST operated as a ‘guaranteed income’ 
for those on welfare or low wages. It lasted until the 
1990 National government cut cash payments and 
reduced wages further with the Employment Con­
tracts Legislation. This four-year provision was 
hardly an income guarantee of a lifetime. Similar 
problems lay behind the feminist movement’s re­
jection of the idea of wages for housework.
In Australia, although the Hawke government 
insisted that it was committed to full employment, 
part of this commitment was directed towards a 
postindustrial pursuit of ‘alternatives to paid work’ 
(Hawke’s phrase). Young unemployed were to learn 
how to survive on communes in the bush, and 
redundant workers were offered the opportunity to 
use their own savings to purchase their jobs and 
convert them into worker co-operatives. Rather 
than promoting a post-industrial vision, such ‘alter­
natives’ only served to remove the existing defences 
of the unemployed, and to trim welfare budgets.
Hence, governments have taken up 
postindustrial plans for quite different motivations, 
and yet the differences are almost imperceptible at 
the policy level. More seriously the actual plans 
often led to further punishment for those unable to 
find work.
The question about policy responses to unem­
ployment, then, is whether there is an alternative to 
wage labour that does not seriously weaken the 
citizenship of whole categories of the population. 
The answer is that it seems highly improbable that 
there is. The second assumption is that markets in 
general will decline in importance with reduced 
labour force participation. A new economic sector 
will develop as a ‘third way’ (neither state-run nor 
capitalist) causing the scope of markets to shrink.
In Third World countries, where labour and 
commodity markets are far less developed, the in­
ternational markets have inordinate influence. But 
even the most powerful governments do not neces­
sarily attempt to confront these markets unless they 
are faced with electoral and other costs. In this, 
Australia is of course a marginal player, for govern­
mental intervention in the markets has been in­
creasingly limited by long-term global develop­
ments.
This contemporary situation is one where the 
corporate ‘citizens’ of the world are in a position to 
pick and choose where the cheapest labour and 
land may be found, limited only by pockets of 
nation-state resistance and relatively weak interna­
tional bodies like human rights and environmental 
bodies and the International Labour Organisation. 
For a semi-peripheral nation like Australia to search 
for alternatives to market participation in such a 
climate is to ignore these trends of global concen­
tration, which are getting more powerful, not less.
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The question of defending a new form of full em­
ployment in Australia is more difficult again, and 
could only make headway if there were interna­
tional moves in this direction. But there is no 
foundation to the idea that people or groups can 
survive ‘outside the market’ in this situation. Where 
it was once possible to subsist by avoiding the 
markets as much as possible, the small-scale units of 
production and available land required fora return 
to widespread self-sufficiency no longer exist.
Rather, it is only possible to set up a worker co­
operative or move to a commune if capital, skills, 
tools, materials and land are available. In this re­
spect these alternatives are no different to other 
small businesses or farms. Furthermore, alternative 
structures of work do not necessarily render the 
state more accountable, or put any controls on the 
markets, even when they are more internally demo­
cratic than conventional places of employment. 
Even though the principle of co-operation is exem­
plary, those with the least resources are least likely 
to be attracted to a fledgling alternative, for they 
have the most to lose. France and Italy have the 
most developed co-operative sector, by contrast, 
Australia hasaco-operativetraditionofrecessionary 
failures.
The other assumption of advocates of an era 
‘beyond employment’ concerns the counter-cul­
ture’s rejection of wage labour. According to 
postindustrialists, the counter-culture showed that 
altemativestowagelabourcouldhavearadicalising 
potential. When imposed by governments from 
above, this is obviously a questionable assumption. 
But even the counter-culture itself became less 
‘subversive’ as time went on. This was pointed out 
at the time, in Australia, in a debate between 
Dennis Altman and the New Left.
Although Altman was enthusiastic in the 1960s 
about the potential for cultural change, he quickly 
realised that the segment of the counter-culture 
which chose the self-marginalisation of rural com­
mune life quickly became quiescent. The radical 
potential remained with the other elements of the 
counter-culture which turned to the feminist, gay 
and green movements. Nowadays, the commune 
movement in Australia is more accurately termed 
an ‘alternative life-style’. It did increase the choice 
of available different ways of life, particularly for 
men, but those who chose to live on communes 
were mostly a social elite who possessed the cultural 
capital to return to conventional work if they wished. 
And, of course, communes are not in themselves 
self-sufficient.
The Australian experience of attempts to im­
pose worker co-operatives and communes from 
above has been an entirely paternalistic one. Re­
dundant workers did not wish to lose their lay-off 
Pay in trying to manage the democratic structures of 
bodies which mostly lasted for less than a year. In 
reality they were passive clients who were to be
educated in the skills of co-operation and who had 
to make constant appeals to the government for 
more money. Those involved in promoting co-ops 
were themselves divided about the most suitable 
structures. The teenagers who were to be moved to 
communes were not interested in learning about 
an alternative lifestyle: they wanted conventional 
jobs. This is not to say that more democratic work 
structures are unimportant, but rather that they 
should not be imposed from above, in times of 
recession, on those with the least material and 
cultural resources for survival, as an alternative to 
vigorous and effective employment policies.
In short, while the intellectual climate that 
fostered a postindustrial era ‘beyond employment’ 
explicitly rejected neoliberalism, the assumptions 
it makes about paid employment have nothing to 
say which can be set as an alternative to the 
strictures of economic liberalism on employment 
policy. The postindustrial search for ‘alternatives’ 
has fostered a belief that mass unemployment need 
not be solved in the conventional way. But there 
do not seem to be any ‘alternative’ utopias arising 
out of our existing unemployment mess. Of course, 
it can still be argued by postindustrialists that 
defending dull, powerless, paid work is inimical to 
the ideal of human emancipation. But the onus is 
also on the proponents of ‘alternatives’ to prove 
that neglecting to press for initiatives to increase 
conventional employment will not make the situ­
ation worse.
Finally, a word about the advantages of full­
time employment, something seldom heard these 
days. In modem life a secure job does provide a 
source of identity—which is obviously of greater 
satisfaction when it is not dull. The question of 
dullness and skill are, however, often political 
issues about the capacity to define skill, working 
conditions and social usefulness. Paid employment 
may seem an onerous imposition, but it also pro­
vides a sense of fulfilment and of contributing to 
the social whole. It also offers protection against 
client status: to withdraw from work for various 
reasons of one’s own choosing is different from 
being permanently excluded from employment. 
(A part-time job, meanwhile, involves a part-time 
wage—meaning, usually, poverty.) People who 
have spent at least some of their lives in paid 
employment are those whose rights are more safe­
guarded by virtue of the obligations they have been 
able, ideally, to assume freely in that employment.
In short, gaining access to one of the key 
modem arenas of social participation, the world of 
paid work, is more a beginning than an end. ■
JOCELYN PIXLEY teaches in the school of 
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is based on her Citizenship and Employment: 
Investigating Post-Industrial Options, Cambridge 
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